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This is the first of a series of articles on the hearsay
rule. The first article discusses the definition of hearsay.
The subsequent articles will examine the exceptions.

..J

INTRODUCTION

supports the exclusion of hearsay. See McCormick,
Evidence§ 245 (3d ed. 1984); 5 Wigmore, Evidence§
1362 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
DEFINITION OF STATEMENT

::J
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Ohio Evidence Rule 801 defines hearsay. The first part
> of the rule sets forth a traditional definition of hearsay.
) Hearsay is defined as a written or oral statement, inluding conduct intended to be an assertion, made by a
declarant out-of-court and offered for the truth of the
assertions contained in the statement. In contrast, subdivision (D) represents an important change in Ohio law; it
provides that certain declarations - prior statements
and admissions- that would otherwise fall within the
definition of subdivisions (A) to (C) are not hearsay and,
~ consequently, are not excludable as hearsay.

Res gestae
The Rules of Evidence avoid the use of the term res
gestae, a confusing phrase which encompasses both
evidence that is not hearsay and evidence that is hearsay
but may fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule. See generally 6 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1767, at 255
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) ("The phrase res gestae has long
been not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful"). As the Supreme Court has remarked, "For the sake
of clarity, it is better to avoid the use of the generalized
phrase res gestae when referring to a distinct exception ..." State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 89 n.3, 524
N.E.2d 466 (1988).

Underlying theory
Hearsay evidence is excluded because it is considered
unreliable. The accuracy of a witness' testimony
depends on the witness' perception, memory, narration,
and sincerity. When a witness testifies at trial these four
factors are subject to cross-examination. In addition, the
witness is required to take an oath, and the jury has an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on
the stand. These conditions- cross-examination, oath,
and presence at trial - are usually lacking when hearsay
evidence is presented. The absence of these safeguards

Rule 801(A) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended by him as an assertion." The first part of this
definition is not controversial. Oral and written assertions
clearly present the hearsay dangers -lack of cross-examination concerning the declarant's perception, memory,
narration, and sincerity. See Hallworth v. Republic Steel
Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 354-56, 91 N.E.2d 690, 693-94
(1950) (learned treatise hearsay); Geller v. Geller, 115 Ohio
St. 468, 154 N.E. 727 (1926) (letter hearsay); Lambert v.
State, 105 Ohio St. 219, 136 N.E. 921 (1922) (information
supplied by a third party hearsay); Smith v. Young, 109
Ohio App. 463, 168 N.E.2d 3 (1958) (conversation hearsay).

Assertive conduct
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended as an
assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay. McCormick
provides the following commentary and illustration:
[l)t must be observed that the line of cleavage between
conduct and statements is one that must be drawn in
the light of substance, rather than form. No one would
contend, if, in response to a question "Who did it?",
one of the auditors held up his hand, that this gesture
could be treated as different from an oral or written
statement, in the application of the hearsay rule. Obviously, though described in terms of conduct, the
actions are as much a part of the speaker's effort at
expression as his words are ... McCormick, Evidence
596 (2d ed. 1972).
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801
provides another illustration: "Some nonverbal conduct,
such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a
lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in
nature, and to be regarded as a statement."
The above examples of assertive conduct illustrate
why such conduct is considered hearsay. They present
the hearsay dangers inherent in perception, memory,
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narration, and sincerity untested by cross-examination.

124 N.E.2d 1.40 (1955), the Supreme Court held:
"Testimony of a witness as to a statement or declaration
by another person is hearsay testimony where that statement or declaration is offered or used only to prove the
truth of the matters asserted therein." Jd (syllabus, para.
1)); accord, State v. Nabozny, 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 375
N.E.2d 784 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S.
811 (1978) (tape recording not offered for truth of assertions); State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St.2d 77, 83-84, 358 N.E.2d
1081, 1087 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911
(1978) (telephone conversation not offered for truth of
assertion).
· .· "IW1e,relevance of an out-of-court statement is that the
statement was made, rather than for the truth of the
assertion contained in the statement, the statement is not
hearsay. State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 348, 528
N.E.2d 910 (1988) ("A statement is not hearsay if it is
admitted to prove that the declarant made it, rather than
to prove the t~uth of its contents."). In such a case, the
hearsay dangers are not present. The declarant's
perception, memory, narration, and sincerity are not critical because the relevance of the statement does not
depend on the veracity of the declarant. See McCormick,
Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984); 6 Wigmore, Evidence §
1766 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
Courts and commentators have recognized a number
of examples of statements not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted. Several are discussed below.

Nonassertive conduct-implied assertions
Conduct that is not intended by the declarant to be an
assertion is not encompassed by the definition of "statement" in Rule 801(A). Accordingly, the hearsay rule is not
a bar to the admissibility of evidence of nonassertive
conduct. Non assertive conduct is sometimes referred to
as "implied assertions." The leading case of Wright v.
Doe D'Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837), held implied
assertions to be hearsay. See McCormick, Evidence §
250 (3d ed. 1984). Rule 801(A) rejects this position. Thus,
for example, evidence of flight from the scene of a crime
is not hearsay under Rule 801 because such conduct is
not intended to be an assertion. See generally State v.
Strub, 48 Ohio App.2d 57, 35 N.E.2d 819 (1975); State v.
Fields, 35 Ohio App.2d 140, 300 N.E.2d 207 (1973); State
v. Whitley, 17 Ohio App.2d 159, 245 N.E.2d 232 (1969).
Although the federal drafters recognized that nonassertive conduct may present some of the hearsay
dangers, they believed that such conduct did not present
a significant risk of insincerity and should, therefore, not
be classified as hearsay.
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested
with respect to the perception, memory, and narration
(or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisory
Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not
justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds.
No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with
assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to
the non-verbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity.
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory
that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a
preliminary determination will be required to determine
whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the party claiming that
the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases
will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibility ... Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 801.

Verbal acts
The verbal acts rule involves verbal conduct "to which
the law attaches duties and liabilities." McCormick,
Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984). In other words, the uttering
of certain words has independent legal significance
under the substantive law. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence §
1710-TChadbOI.Jrn rev. 1976). For example, words
constituting the offer and acceptance of a contract are
verbal acts. These statements are not offered to prove
the truth of the assertion; they are offered in evidence
only to show that the words were uttered. Ct. Leggett v.
State, 15 Ohio 283 (1846). Statements constituting an
offer of a bribe, an illegal solicitation, or entrapment are
other examples. See also Staff Note ("Words constituting
conduct are not hearsay, e.g., words of a contract, libel,
slander, threats and the like.").

OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as a "statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing ..." Hence, an out-of-court statement
does not lose its hearsay character simply because the
declarant later becomes a witness at trial and testifies
about the statement. For example, if an eyewitness to a
crime makes a statement at the time of the crime and
later testifies at trial, the prior statement is hearsay if
offered for the truth of the assertion; to be admissible, it
must fall within an exception. See Rules 803 and 804.

Statements offered to show effect on hearer
In many cases a person's state of mind- his knowledge, belief, good faith, reasonableness- is an issue.
See McCormick, Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984); 6
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1789 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). For
example, if an accused claims self-defense, his reasonable fear of the victim becomes an issue. Accordingly,
statements made to the defendant regarding the victim's
dangerous or violent character are relevant to show the
accused's subjective state of mind. These statements are
offered not to show that the victim was, in fact, a dangerous or violent person, but only to show that such information was communicated to the defendant. See McGraw v.
State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 174 N.E. 741 (1931); State v.
Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907); Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); Marts v. State, 26
Ohio St. 162 (1875).

OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." This definition is consistent with
the prior Ohio cases. In Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488,
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there can be no dispute as to whether the prior statement was made; and (2) the context of a formal
proceeding, an oath, and the opportunity for crossexamination provide firm additional assurances of the
reliability of the prior statement. H.R. Rep. No. 650,
93d Gong., 1st Sess., (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
Code Gong. & Ad. News, 7075, 7086-87.
Statements made at a prior trial, a suppression hearing, a preliminary hearing, or any other proceeding at
which testimony is taken under oath, subject to penalty of
perjury, and subject to cross-examination qualify under
Rule 801(D)(1)(a). In contrast to the federal rule, statements made before a grand jury do not qualify because
such statements are not subject to cross-examination at
the time they are made. Grand jury statements, however,
are admissible if inconsistent with the witness' trial
testimony and offered for impeachment. See Rule 613.

Declarant's state of mind
A person's mental state is often a consequential or
material issue. If that person makes a statement that
manifests his state of mind, the statement is relevant.
Frequently, such statements are hearsay, but fall within
- the exception for presently existing state of mind. See
Rule 803(3). In other cases, the statements show the
declarant's state of mind only circumstantially. In these
cases the statement is not offered to prove the truth of
the assertion and thus does not implicate the hearsay
rule. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1790 (Chadbourn rev.
1976). One of the more difficult examples involves statements offered by a defendant to establish insanity.
Evidence that the defendant has stated "I am the
Emperor of Africa" is offered not to prove that the defendant is the Emperor of Africa, but rather as evidence of
the defendant's insane delusions. As such, it would
appear not to invoke the hearsay prohibition. This analysis, however, is not free from criticism. See 6 Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1766, at 250 and n. 1 (Chadbourn rev. 1976);
Hinton, State of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 394, 397-98 (1934).

t

PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Rule 801(D)(1)(b) provides that prior consistent statements of a witness are admissible as substantive
evidence if "offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." For example, a statement made
before the state's offer of leniency, the alleged motive for
fabrication, is admissible. State v. Mullins, 34 Ohio
App.3d 192, 196, 517 N.E.2d 945 (Fairfield 1986).
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under prior
law, prior consistent statements were generally inadmissible, even if offered only for rehabilitation. Such statements were admissible, however, if offered to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication, Miller v. Piqua Transfer &
Storage Co., 57 Ohio Abs. 325, 92 N.E.2d 452 (C.P.
1950), in which case the statement could be considered
for rehabilitative purposes but not as substantive
evidence. Under the rule, such statements are substantively admissible.
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
except for technical differences. In contrast to the rule on
prior inconsistent statements, Rule 801(D)(1)(a), a prior
consistent statement need not have been given under
oath, subject to penalty of perjury, and subject to crossexamination.
In Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vance, 21 Ohio App.3d
205, 486 N.E.2d 1206 (Franklin 1985), the court wrote:
Because the result of exclusion of prior consistent
statements, where they are sought to be used for
rebuttal purposes, would be to permit an implication of
fabrication or falsification to stand without challenge,
their admission should be favored to the extent that a
generous view should be taken of the entire trial setting in order to determine if there was sufficient impeachment of the witness to amount to a charge of fabrication or improper influence or motivation. /d. at 207.

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Rule 801(0)(1)(a) provides that certain types of prior
inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive
evidence. The rule accomplishes this result by defining
such statements as non hearsay. Five conditions must be
satisfied before a prior statement is admissible under the
rule: (1) the declarant must testify, subject to cross" examination, at the trial or hearing; (2) the prior statement must be inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony; (3) the prior statement must have been given under
oath; (4) the prior statement must have been "subject to
cross-examination by the party against whom the statement is offered'; and (5) the prior statement must have
been "subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,
or other proceeding, or in a deposition ..."
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under prior
law, prior inconsistent statements were admissible only
for impeachment; such statements were offered not for
the truth of the assertion contained therein, but only to
show that the statement was made and is inconsistent
with the witness' trial testimony. Prior inconsistent statements that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule
801(0)(1)(a) are still admissible for impeachment; Rule
613 sets forth the foundational requirements for admissibility of these statements.
Rule 801(0)(1)(a) differs from its federal counterpart.
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require that the prior
statement had been subject to cross-examination at the
time it was made. The Ohio rule is based on the version
of the federal rule that was proposed by the House
Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee Report
contains the following commentary:
The Rule as amended draws a distinction between
types of prior inconsistent statements ... and allows
only those made while the declarant was subject to
cross-examination at a trial or hearing or in a deposition, to be admissible for their truth ... The rationale
for the Committee's decision is that (1) unlike in most
other situations involving unsworn or oral statement

STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION
Rule 801(D)(1)(c) provides that a witness' prior statement "of identification of a person soon after perceiving"
that person is admissible as substantive evidence "if the
circumstances demonstrate the reliability of the prior
identification." For example, an identification made at a
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lineup, show-up, photographic display, or prior hearing,
falls within the rule. Even though statements of identification are a type of prior consistent statement, the limitations of Rule 801(D)(1)(b) do not apply to such statements.

On review, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Confrontation Clause did not bar testimony concerning a
prior out-of-court identification when the identifying
witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain
the basis for the identification. According to the Court,
the Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective
cross-examination. This right is satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as a
bad memory.
The Court also considered a hearsay objection. Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) excludes from the hearsay
rule aprior statement "of identification of a person made
after perceiving the person," if the declarant "testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement." The Court ruled that the
requirements of this provision had been satisfied. The
witness had been subjected to cross-examination
"concerning the statement." He was placed on the stand,
took the oath, and responded willingly to questions.

Prior law
The rule apparently changes Ohio law. RC 2945.44
provides: "When identification of the defendant is an issue,
a witness who has on a previous occasion identified such
person may testify to such previous identification. Such
identification may be proved by other witnesses." On its face,
this statute appears to permit the substantive use of prior
identifications. In State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St.2d 83, 267
N.E.2d 291 (1971), however, the Supreme Court interpreted
the statute as permitting the use of prior identifications only
as corroborative, rather than substantive, evidence. /d.
(syllabus, para. 5). Under the corroboration theory, the
witness had to make an in-court identification before
evidence of a prior identification could be admitted.
Under the rule, prior identifications are admissible as
substantive evidence; thus, the rule applies whether or not
the witness makes an identification at trial. So long as the
witness who has made the prior identification is "subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement" at trial, the
statement regarding the prior identification, as well as the
testimony of other witnesses who were present at the time
of the identification, is admissible. See Staff Note.

Constitutional requirements
As the Staff Note indicates, the rule does not "obviate
constitutional requirements relating to lineups and the
like ..."The rule covers only the hearsay aspects of
pretrial identifications. In criminal cases identification
evidence also must satisfy Sixth Amendment and due
process requirements. The Sixth Amendment requires
the presence of counsel at some types of identification
procedures. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)
(preliminary hearings); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973) (right to counsel not applicable at photographic
display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to
counsel attaches at commencement of judicial adversary
proceedings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Due process requires that identification evidence be
reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 4:: ~U.S. 98 (1977);
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The Ohio cases are
discussed in Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure ch.
33 (2d ed. 1987).

Federal rule
The rule differs from its federal counterpart. Statements
concerning prior identifications are admissible only upon a
showing that the "circumstances demonstrate the reliability of the prior identification." The federal rule does not
contain this requirement. The reliability requirement is
patterned after Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C),
which contains the phrase "if the court is satisfied that
the circumstances of the prior identification demonstrate
the reliability of the prior identification." The Committee
Comment to the Minnesota rule states:
The rationale for the rule stems from the belief that if
the original identification procedures were conducted
fairly, the prior identification would tend to be more
probative than an identification at trial. Obviously, if the
prior identification did not occur under circumstances
insuring its trustworthiness, the identification should
not be admissible. The Court must be satisfied as to
the trustworthiness of the out-of-court identification
before allowing it to be introduced as substantive
evidence.

Mug shots
An in-court identification cannot be bolstered by the
use of photographs that reveal the defendant's prior
criminal record. In State v. Breedlove, 26 Ohio St.2d 178,
271 N.E.2d 238 (1971}, the Supreme Court stated, "Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, we believe it
unjustifiable for the state, on direct examination, to present police mug shots, bearing police identification
numbers, from which a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the defendant, at some indefinite time in the
past had had trouble with the law." /d. at 184. See also
State v. Wilkinson, 26 Ohio St.2d 185, 271 N.E.2d 242
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 968 (1971}. In effect,
evidence indicating a prior criminal record violates Rule
404(A), which generally prohibits the introduction of
character evidence.

Confrontation
In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), the
U.S. Supreme Court considered the applicability of
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(c). John Foster, a correctional
counselor, was assaulted in a federal prison. He suffered
a fractured skull, which resulted in an impaired memory.
While hospitalized, he identified Owens as his attacker
and picked his picture from an array of photographs. At
trial, Foster testified about the attack, including his identification of Owens while in the hospital. On crossexamination, however, he admitted that he could not
remember seeing his assailant. Owens was convicted
and appealed on hearsay and confrontation grounds.

ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY-OPPONENT
Rule 801(0)(2} exempts admissions of a partyopponent from the scope of the hearsay rule. The Rule
recognizes several different types of admissions, three of
which are often encountered in criminal cases: (1)
4
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individual admissions; (2) adoptive admissions; and (3)
co-conspirator admissions.
According to the Staff Note "[u]nder prior Ohio law, an
admission was characterized as an exception to the
hearsay rule." Instead of treating admissions as an
exception, the Evidence Rules exempt admissions from
the definition of hearsay.
According to the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 801, admissions of party-opponents "are excluded
from the category of hearsay on the theory that their
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary
system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule." In other words, the adversary system
imposes upon a party the burden of explaining his prior
statements that are inconsistent with his·current position.
In any event, although the theory of admissibility is
changed by the Rules of Evidence, the result is generally
the same as under prior law.

Confessions
The confession of a criminal defendant is an admission of a party-opponent. Some Ohio cases attempt to
distinguish confessions and admissions, characterizing
confessions as a complete acknowledgment of guilt and
admissions as something less. See State v. Klumpp, 15
0.0.2d 461, 175 N.E.2d 767 (App. 1960). The distinction
is usually not important. Both confessions and admissions are admissible under Rule 801(D)(2)(A). State v.
Byrd, 32 Ohio St.3d 79, 89, 512 N.E.2d 611 (1987), cert.
denied 108 S.Ct. 763 (1988). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held the distinction irrelevant when a statement obtained from a defendant by the police is
challenged on constitutional grounds. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966).
Rule 801(D)(2)(A) governs only the hearsay aspects of
admissions. It is not concerned with the constitutional
requirements surrounding the obtaining of statements
from defendants by the police. See Miranda v. Arizona,
supra (5th Amendment requirements); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (6th Amendment requirements). See generally Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and
Seizure ch. 31 (2d ed. 1987).
Like many jurisdictions, Ohio imposes a corroboration
requirement on the admissibility of confessions. Under
this rule, there must be some independent evidence of
the corpus delicti before a confession is admissible. See
State v. Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304, 376 N.E.2d 948 (1978);
State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051
(1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978);
State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916);
State v. King, 10 Ohio App.3d 161, 460 N.E.2d 383
(Hamilton 1983); State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396, 457
N.E.2d 834 (Hamilton 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983); State v. Ralston, 67 Ohio App.2d 81, 425 N.E.2d
916 (1979). See generally McCormick, Evidence§ 158 (3d
ed. 1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2070-75 (Chadbourn
rev. 1978).

Declarations against interest distinguished
Admissions are often confused with the hearsay
exception relating to declarations against interest, which
is governed by Rule 804(b)(3). See Goz v. Tenney, 104
Ohio St. 500, 505, 136 N.E. 215, 216 (1922). There are
several differences between the two rules. First, the firsthand knowledge and competency rules do not apply to
admissions; these rules do apply to declarations against
interest. Second, to qualify as an admission, a statement
need not have been against the interest of the declarant
when made; the declaration against interest exception
turns on the adverse nature of the statement when it was
made. Third, the declarant need not be unavailable in
order for an admission to be introduced. In contrast, a
declaration against interest is not admissible unless the
declarant is unavailable at the time of trial. Finally, declarations against interest need not be made by a party. See
Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App.2d 18, 24-25, 263 N.E.2d
574, 579 (1970); McCormick, Evidence § 262 (3d ed.
1984); Note, Admissions "Against Interest" in Ohio, 15
Ohio St. L.J. 187 (1954).

ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS

INDIVIDUAL ADMISSIONS

Rule 801(D)(2)(b) provides that a statement about
which a party "has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth" is admissible as substantive evidence if offered
against that party. The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 801 contains the following commentary:
Under established principles an admission may be
made by adopting or acquiescing in the statement of
another. While knowledge of contents would ordinarily
be essential, this is not inevitably so: "X is a reliable
person and knows what he is talking about." See
McCormick§ 246, p. 527, n. 15. Adoption or acquiescence may be manifested in any appropriate manner.
When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the
person would, under the circumstances, protest the
statement made in his presence, if untrue. The decision in each case calls for an evaluation in terms of
probable human behavior. In civil cases, the results
have generally been satisfactory. In criminal cases,
however, troublesome questions have been raised by
decisions holding that failure to deny is an admission:
the inference is a fairly weak one, to begin with; silence
may be motivated by advice of counsel or realization

Rule 801(D)(2)(a) provides that statements of a party, in
either his individual or representative capacity, are
admissible as substantive evidence if offered against
that party. However, a party cannot introduce his own
statements under this rule. State v. Gatewood, 15 Ohio
App.3d 14, 472 N.E.2d 63 (Hamilton 1984).

~

Pleas of guilty
A plea of guilty in a criminal case is an admission and
thus may be admissible against a party-opponent in a
subsequent case. See Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St.
216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Freas v. Sullivan, 130 Ohio
St. 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936); Clark v. Irvin, 9 Ohio 131
(1839). Rule 410, however, precludes the admissibility of
guilty pleas that are subsequently withdrawn, pleas of no
contest, pleas of guilty in a violations bureau, offers to
plead guilty and no contest, and statements made in
connection with and relevant to such pleas and offers.
Pleas of guilty that do not fall within the exclusion of Rule
410 are admissible as admissions.

5

that "anything you say may be used against you";
unusual opportunity is afforded to manufacture
evidence; and encroachment upon the privilege
againstself-incrimination seems inescapably to be
involved.
A party may expressly adopt the statement of a third
person or he may acquiesce by failing to deny or correct
the statement of a third person under circumstances in
which it would be natural to deny or correct the truth of
the statement (adoption by silence). See State v. Swiger,
5 Ohio St.2d 151, 160, 214 N.E.2d 417, 424, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 874 (1966) (express adoption); Price v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 33 Ohio App.3d 301, 307, 515
N.E.2d 931 (Cuyahoga 1986) (adoption by conduct);
State v. Poole, 50 Ohio App.2d 204, 362 N.E.2d 678
(1976) (express adoption).

statements in a letter may be considered to be an adoption if under the circumstances it would have been natural to answer or object to the contents of the letter. See
Akron Milk Producers, Inc. v. lsaly Dairy Co., 109 Ohio
App. 155, 164 N.E.2d 579 (1959) (adoption); Wolfson v.
Horn, 94 Ohio App. 530, 116 N.E.2d 751 (1953) (adoption); Aftel v. Cound, 32 Ohio App. 270, 167 N.E. 402
(1928) (no adoption)i McCormick, Evidence § 270 {3d ed.
1984). As in all cases of adoption by silence, the surrounding circumstances are critical. In A. B. Leach & Co., Inc.
v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120 (1927), Justice Holmes wrote:
A man cannot make evidence for himself by writing
a letter containing the statements that he wishes to
prove~Re~Cfoesnofmal<ectheletter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the
facts. He no more can impose a duty to answer a
charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending
goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse
assertions in the absence of further circumstances
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as
an admission. /d. at 128.

Adoption by silence
The Ohio cases have recognized the admission-bysilence rule. See Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41, 47, 109
N.E. 626, 628 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628
(1881); Accurate Employment Service v. Rowell, 69 Ohio
Abs. 452, 455, 126 N.E.2d 81, 84 (C.P. 1954). In Zeller v.
State, 123 Ohio St. 519, 176 N.E. 81 (1931), the Supreme
Court stated: "The only theory upon which any confession by silence is admissible is that the statement of the
third per~on, in the presence of the accused, is made
under such circumstances that the silence of the
accused gives rise to a natural and reasonable inference
of assent thereto ..." /d. at 523.
In many cases, however, the courts have found that the
circumstances did not require a response and thus,
silence was not equivalent to assent. E.g., Zeller v. State,
supra; Geigerv, State, 70 Ohio St. 400, 71 N.E. 721
(1904); Griffith v. Zipperwick and Lodge, 28 Ohio St. 388,
409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37 OhioApp. 540, 175 N.E. 29
(1930). See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 71 (1975).
In Geiger, supra the Court commented on the admissibility of "a confession by silence": "We cannot refrain from
the observation, that before a court admits this class of
confessions, great caution should be exercised ... It is
not every instance of silence in the hearing of accusation
that renders it admissible, as admitting guilt." /d. at 413.
These cases are consistent with McCormick's position
that "the essential inquiry in each case is whether a
reasonable person would have denied under the circumstances ..." McCormick, Evidence § 270, at 801 (3d ed.
1984). It is not sufficient that the statement was made in
the presence of a party. McCormick lists several factors
that should be considered in determining admissibility:
(1) The statement must have been heard by the party
claimed to have acquiesced. (2) It must have been
understood by him. (3) The subject matter must have
been within his knowledge ... (4) Physical or emotional
impediments to responding must not be present. (5)
The personal makeup of the speaker, e.g., young child,
or his relationship to the party or the event, e.g.,
bystander, may be such as to make it unreasonable to
expect a denial. (6) Probably most important of all, the
statement itself must be such as would, if untrue, call
for a denial under the circumstances. /d.
The adoption-by-silence rule also may apply to
correspondence, that is, the failure to answer or correct

Criminal cases
The application of the adoption-by-silence rule in criminal cases is limited by constitutional principle'. In State
v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St.2d 76,263 N.E.2d 77.:5 (1970), the
Supreme Court commented on the admissibility of a
defendant's silence following arrest:
In the first detention of a suspect it is not uncommon
to react by refusing to discuss the charges until a
lawyer can be retained. Desire for friendly counsel and
advice can be a major motivation at the time in the
mind of one completely innocent of the charges, as
well as one who subsequently may admit his guilt. His
privilege [against self-incrimination] at that time is
silence ... he should notthereafter be penalized for
his original refusal. /d. at 81.
See also State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St. 3d 279, 284, 513
N.E.2d 311 (1987) (conclusory statements of deputies not
adoptive admissions); State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d
14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), vacated on other grounds,
438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Young, 27 Ohio St.2d 310,
272 N.E.2d 353 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408
U.S. 940 (1972) (waiver of the privilege). In Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
examination of a defendant at trial concerning his postarrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings violated
due process. Consequently, a defendant's silence in face
of an accusation by the police cannot be admitted in
evidence if Miranda warnings were given.
CO-CONSPIRATOR ADMISSIONS
Rule 801(D)(2)(e) provides that a statement made by a
co-conspirator of a party during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy is admissible as substantive evidence if
offered against that party. The rule applies in civil as well
as in criminal cases. See Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 1
(1861).
The theory underlying the co-conspirator rule is
unclear. In an early Ohio case, the Supreme Court stated
that "the act and declaration of each [co-conspirator] in
prosecution of the enterprise, and while engaged in
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accomplishing the common design, is to be considered
the act and declaration of all, each being deemed the
agent of all." Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St. 467, 470 (1856).
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801,
however, rejects the agency theory. "[T)he agency theory
of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as
a basis for admissibility beyond that already established." The Note, however, fails to provide an alternative
theory to justify admissibility. See generally 4 Louisell &
Mueller, Federal Evidence 362-67 (1980); 4 Weinstein &
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 801(d)(2)(E)[01) (1988).
The co-conspirator rule applies if five conditions are
established: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the
defendant's participation in the conspiracy; (3) the
declarant's participation in the conspiracy; (4) the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy; and
(5) the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy.
These conditions are discussed below. If the statement
was part of the agreement (the actus reus of conspiracy),
the statement may be admissible under the verbal acts
doctrine, and resort to this rule is unnecessary. See 4
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence 357-61 (1980).

371 U.S. 471 (1963); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211
(1946). Similarly, the defendant's arrest usually
terminates his participation in the conspiracy and makes
subsequent statements by co-conspirators inadmissible
against him.
During the course of the conspiracy
The rule requires that the statement be made "during
the course" of the conspiracy. The prior Ohio cases had
recognized this requirement. In Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St.
467 (1856), the Supreme Court held that one of the limitations on the admissibilitY'of co-conspirator statements
was that the statement must be made "during the
pendency of the criminal enterprise ..." /d. (syllabus);
accord, Sharpe v. State, 29 Ohio St. 263 (1876); Rufer v.
State, 25 Ohio St. 464 (1874); Fouts v. State, 7 Ohio St.
471 (1857).
A conspiracy commences when the agreement is
reached and terminates when the objectives have been
achieved or abandoned. Statements of co-conspirators
made after the conspiracy ends are not admissible. See
Sharpe v. State, supra. Determining the time when the
conspiracy terminates, however, has proven troublesome. The majority view is that statements made after
the objectives have been achieved, but while the conspirators are attempting to avoid detection (the concealment
phase) are inadmissible. See McCormick, Evidence 793
(3d ed. 1984).
The Ohio Supreme Court has not always followed this
rule. In State v. Shelton, 51 Ohio St.2d 1152 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 909 (1978), the Court held:
"A declaration of a conspirator, made subsequent to the
actual commission of the crime, may be admissible
against any co-conspirator if it was made while the
conspirators were still concerned with the concealment
of their criminal conduct or their identity." /d. (syllabus,
para. 2); accord, State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583,
587, 433 N.E.2d 561 (1982) (during conspiracy or "resulting coverup"); State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552,
558-59,62 N.E.2d 332,335-36 (1945).
Concealment phase statements, however, may not be
admissible under Rule 801(0)(2)(e). The Advisory
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801 reads: "The rule is
consistent with the position of the Supreme Court in
denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives of the conspiracy have either failed or been
achieved. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440
(1949); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490
(1963)." The federal rule, as stated in Kru/ewitch and
Wong Sun, has consistently excluded concealment
phase statements. See Anderson v. United States, 417
U.S. 211, 218 (1974); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81
(1970); McCormick, Evidence 646 (2d ed. 1971)
("attempts to expand the so-called 'concealment phase'
to include all efforts to avoid detection have generally
failed, as in Krulewitch v. United States ...").
Although the rule may be inconsistent with the syllabus statement in Shelton, supra, it is not necessarily
inconsistent with the facts of Shelton. The statement in
that case was made just an hour after the crime, while
the co-conspirator was attempting to dispose of the
murder weapon. Such close proximity between the crime
and statement may be sufficient to warrant admission of

Existence of the conspiracy
The rule applies only if the prosecution has established the existence of a conspiracy. Conspiracy has
been defined as requiring "(1) an agreement between
two or more persons ... and (2) an intent to thereby
achieve a certain objective which, under the common law
definition, is the doing of either an unlawful act or a
lawful act by unlawful means." LaFave & Scott, Criminal
Law 525 (2d ed. 1986).
The crime of conspiracy, however, need not be
charged in the indictment or information in order to
invoke the rule. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
comments: "While the rule refers to a co-conspirator, it is
this committee's understanding that the rule is meant to
carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a
joint venturer is considered as a co-conspirator for the
purposes of this rule even though no conspiracy has
been charged." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Gong. Ad. News 7051, 7073.
This position is consistent with prior Ohio law. See State
v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St.
457 (1889).
Declarant's and defendant's participation
With one exception, the statement must have been
made while both the declarant and the defendant were
members of the conspiracy. The exception involves the
jefendant who joins an on-going conspiracy, in which
~ase the defendant is deemed to have adopted all prior
>tatements made by the other co-conspirators. See Unit3d States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
393 (1948).
Hence, if the defendant withdraws from the conspiracy
Jefore the objectives are achieved or abandoned, statenents made by other co-conspirators after his withdrawal
~re not admissible against him. Moreover, the arrest of
he declarant terminates his participation in the conspira:y and makes his post-arrest statements inadmissible
lgainst the defendant. See Wong Sun v. United States,
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the statement.
Under some circumstances; extending the duration
of the conspiracy beyond the commission of the principal crime to include concomitant and closely connected disposition of its fruits or concealment of its
traces appears justifiable, as in the case of police
officers engaged in writing up a false report to conceal
police participation in a burglary or disposal of the body
after a murder. McCormick, Evidence 793 (3d ed. 1984).
One recent case, however, has ruled that "concealment phase" statements are admissible under Ohio Rule
801. State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396,401,457 N.E.2d
834 (1982).
It should be noted that this rule does not govern the
admissibility of evidence of acts engaged in during the
concealment phase. Such acts may be admissible if relevant to prove the existence of the conspiracy. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-22, (1974); Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953).

In furtherance of the conspiracy
The rule requires that the statement be made "in
furtherance of the conspiracy." Numerous prior Ohio
cases had recognized this requirement without discussing its basis. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224,
240-41,364 N.E.2d 224,235 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio
St.2d 135, 143, 359 N.E.2d 78, 84 (1976), vacated on
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Carver, 30
Ohio St.2d 280,285 N.E.2d 26 (1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1044 (1972); State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71
N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947);
G()ir1S v. ~t(i~(3. ~6 ()hio St. 457,_g1 N.E. 476 (1889); Kent
v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426, 430 (1884); Rufer v. State, 25
Ohio St. 464 (1874); Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 1
(1861); Fouts v. State, 7 Ohio St. 471 (1857); Patton v.
State, 6 Ohio St. 467 (1856).
Statements that are only casual admissions or merely
inform the listener of the declarant's activities are not
made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Statements that
provide assurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among the conspirators, or inform each conspirator
of the current status of the conspiracy do further the ends
of the conspiracy and are admissible. Similarly, statements that seek to induce someone into joining the
conspiracy or assist the conspirators in meeting their
objectives are admissible. See also 4 Louisell & Mueller,
Federal Evidence 348 (1980) ("Idle chit-chat, mere bragging, descriptive comments, and statements deliberately
inculpating other conspirators and knowingly made to
law enforcement agents are clearly excluded by this
requirement ...").

Independent evidence; standard of proof
The Ohio rule expressly requires that the conspiracy,
as well as the declarant's and defendant's participation,
be established "upon independent proof of the conspiracy." In other words, the statement itself cannot be used to
establish the existence of the conspiracy. Federal practice is different. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. , 107
S.Ct. 2775 (1987).
The independent proof requirement is based on Michigan Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and is consistent with

prior Ohio cases. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224,
240, 364 N.E.2d 224, 235 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978) (conspiracy established by
"other evidence"); State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St.2d 1.35,
143,359 N.E.2d 78, 84 (1976), vacated on other drounds,
438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Carver, 30 Ohio St.2d 280,
287, 285 N.E.2d 26, 31 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044
(1972).
The defendant's own admissions, which are admissible under Rule 801(D)(2)(a), however, are independent
evidence and thus may be used to establish, the
conspiracy. State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396. 401,457
N.E.2d834(1983).
The standard of proof in determining admissibility may
differ in federal and Ohio cases. In Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S., 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987}, the I .S. Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court in determining the admissibility of co-conspirator statements must use the "preponderance of evidence" standard of proof.
Prior to the adoption of the Rule of Evidence, the Ohio
cases had used the prima facie case standard. See State
v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St. 2d 223,232,400 N.E.2d 401,407
(1980); State v. Weind, supra, 50 Ohio St.2d at 240; State
v. Osborne, supra, at 143; State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St.
263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 839
(1947); State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552, 558-59, 62
N.E.2d 332, 335-36 (1945); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St.
457, 21 N.E. 476 (1889). Recent cases continue to use
the prima facie case standard. State v. Martin, 9 Ohio
App.3d 150, 151, 458 N.E.2d 898 (1983); State v. Milo, 6
Ohio App.3d 19, 22, 451 N.E.2d 1253 (1982).

Right of confrontation.
Generally, the Sixth Amendment requires the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarantahd the reliability of the ollt-oH:ourt deClaration. In
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S., 107 S.Ct. 2775,
(1987), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that co-conspirator
statements automatically satisfied the reliability requirement imposed by the Confrontation Clause, because
they fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." In
United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the Court held
that the unavailability of the declarant need not be established as condition for admitting co-conspirator statements.

